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We examine the relevance of an auction format in a competitive environment by comparing uni-
form and discriminatory price auctions with many bidders in a private values setting. We show that if the
number of objects for sale is small relative to the number of bidders, then all equilibria of both auctions
are approximately efficient and lead to approximately the same revenue. When the number of objects
for sale is proportional to the number of bidders, then the particulars of the auction format matter. All
equilibria of the uniform auction are efficient, while all of the equilibria of the discriminatory auction
are inefficient. The relative revenue rankings of the auction formats can go in either direction, depend-
ing on the specifics of the environment. These conclusions regarding the efficiency and revenue ranking
are in contrast to the previous literature, which focused on the case of independent information across
agents.
1. INTRODUCTION
In many markets, including treasury auctions, Initial Public Offerings, security markets, and
internet-based markets, large numbers of agents compete for a limited supply of resources. These
markets use a variety of rules for setting prices, including uniform price auctions, discriminatory
price (pay-your-bid) auctions, and hybrids of these, among others. A fundamental question arises
as to when competitive pressures render the choice of mechanism irrelevant.
A classic view is that with many agents, a set supply of objects (either fixed or in per capita
terms) and some reasonable trading mechanism, an equilibrium of most reasonable auction for-
mats should approach a competitive equilibrium, and so the particulars of the trading mechanism
should be largely irrelevant. In the limit, the agents who value the objects the most should obtain
them and end up paying a price that is close to the marginal valuation—that is, where the demand
and supply curves cross.1
In this paper we examine and refute this view by comparing the two canonical auction for-
mats: a uniform price auction where all units are sold at the same price, which is some variation
1. An important debate regards the structure of Treasury auctions. For, the most part this literature does not con-
sider the effect of a high degree of competition, which is the main focus of this paper. For some of the highlights of
that literature see Friedman (1960), Bikhchandani and Huang (1989), Chari and Weber (1992), Back and Zender (1993),
Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996), Hortasçu (2001), and Klemperer (2003).
961
962 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
of the highest non-winning bid,2 and a discriminatory auction where the winning bids are the
prices paid. Our main result is that there are no differences between auction formats if and only
if the number of items being sold is negligible compared to the number of bidders. If the supply
is non-negligible, then the auction format has implications with regards to both efficiency and
expected revenues.
To be more specific, we consider the following setting. A seller is interested in selling some
number of identical objects to a number of potential buyers. We examine limits as the number of
buyers (and sometimes the number of objects) becomes large. Each buyer may be interested in
one or perhaps more units. Our interest is in comparing the two most prominent auction formats:
a uniform price auction and a discriminatory auction. We consider the resulting allocations and
the expected revenues the seller obtains. In both mechanisms, the supply is awarded to the highest
k bids. The difference lies in the way prices are set. This turns out to have important implications
for equilibrium bidding behaviour and the efficiency of the allocation of the goods.
We first consider situations where the supply of objects is fixed and thus small relative to
the number of bidders as we let the number of bidders grow. There we find that
1. If the supply is fixed then the allocations of all equilibria of either auction format converge
to efficient allocations and the seller extracts the full surplus (i.e. the seller’s revenue con-
verges to the sum of the winning buyers’ valuations).3 We illustrate this in Section 2 in
Example 1 and show it formally in Section 4.
Next, we consider the case where the supply of objects grows in proportion to the number
of bidders. There we find that
2. If the number of units is proportional to the number of bidders then the auction format
matters and impacts both the allocation and the expected revenues.
− In terms of efficiency, all equilibria of the uniform price auction converge to efficient
allocations; while with multiple-unit demands and decreasing marginal valuations,
all equilibria of the discriminatory auction lead to inefficient allocations, even in the
limit. We illustrate this in Section 2 in Example 2 and show it formally in Section 5.1.
− In terms of revenue, the ranking is ambiguous (despite the clear ranking in terms of
efficiency).
• In the case where agents desire only a single unit (or multiple units at the same
marginal valuation), the auctions can be clearly ranked and the uniform price
auction yields strictly higher limiting revenues than the discriminatory auction.
We illustrate this in Section 2 in Example 3 and show it formally in Section 5.3.
• In cases where agents desire more than one unit and have decreasing marginal
valuations for additional units, then the ranking can go either way, and in some
cases the discriminatory auction can yield strictly higher limiting revenues than
the uniform price auction. We illustrate this in Section 2 in Example 4.
Understanding the difference between a fixed supply and a proportional supply of objects
for sale helps develop intuition for our results.
2. There are some variations to consider here, depending on whether agents pay only the highest non-winning bid
among the other agents or among all agents (so one of their own bids might set the price). All such variations lead to the
same consequences from our perspective.
3. In the limit, with a fixed number of objects and a large number of bidders, competitive pressures ensure that
the winning bidders will all have nearly the same value and bid close to their values. So, there would be vanishing
consumer surplus in a competitive market. Thus, “full surplus extraction” refers to the fact that the price converges to the
competitive price for that case and is not a deep statement about extraction of consumer surplus.
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When there is a fixed supply of units for sale (that is small relative to the number of bid-
ders), an agent realizes that when he or she wins an object there are necessarily other bidders
who have very similar information and valuations who are not getting objects. Regardless of the
mechanism, this yields a competitive pressure that pushes bidders to bid close to their values in
order to have any chance of winning and implies that only the bidders with the very highest types
will get objects. This implies an efficient allocation and results in the full possible revenue going
to the seller.
In contrast, when the supply of objects is proportional to the number of bidders, then even
with many bidders, and many of each type, ex post there will be whole neighbourhoods of types
who end up getting objects and whole neighbourhoods of other types who do not. Changing a
bid now leads to a continuous change in the expectation of obtaining an object. Even though
an individual bidder is negligible in terms of the overall allocation, each bidder realizes that
adjusting his or her bid provides important trade-offs between the price that he or she pays and
the probability of obtaining an object. Here there is an opportunity for the mechanism to matter,
and indeed it does.
With a uniform price auction, agents are essentially price takers as changing their bid can
have little impact on the price, and so they have incentives to bid their value as that means that
they win under precisely the right circumstances (when the price is below their value). This leads
to efficient allocations, even with multiple-unit demands.
However, in a discriminatory price auction agents are not price takers—even in the limit.
Their bids affect their payments and they have an incentive to lower their bids to lower the price
that they pay, and they trade this off against the probability of no longer winning an object. If
each agent desires at most one unit, then under affiliated values, agents with higher values have
higher expectations about where the marginal bid will lie, and hence they bid more aggressively.
Thus, bids turn out to be monotone in value and the allocation is efficient. However, if agents
demand more than one unit and have decreasing marginal valuations, then it is possible that
agents who have the same value for some object (say the first object for one bidder and the second
for another bidder) could have very different beliefs about the aggregate demand. This breaks the
monotonicity of bidding, as it leads to differences in expectations that bidders with the identical
value for an object have about the change in probability of winning due to a change in bids. It
is similar to having agents see two separate pieces of information: one is their own value, and
another is information about the aggregate demand. In such a world with an uncoupling of valu-
ations and information about aggregate demand one would end up with inefficient allocations,
and that is what is happening here. While in our model we have only a single signal per bidder,
the fact that bidders have downward-sloping demands has a similar effect.4
The comparison of revenues between the discriminatory and uniform price auctions with a
proportional supply of objects comes down to the incentives that bidders have to shade their bids
on different objects. With single-unit demands, bidders shade bids sufficiently in a discrimina-
tory auction so that there is an unambiguously lower revenue than in the uniform price auction.
However, with multiple-unit demands, agents can end up bidding aggressively enough on some
units that they end up paying more in a discriminatory auction than in a uniform auction. This
depends on the particulars of the circumstances.
Before turning to the formal presentation of the model we make two further comments.
Since we consider general multi-unit demands, there are some implicit asymmetries in the auc-
tions we analyse. That is, bids for a first object of value v can be very different from bids on
4. This is different from the inefficiency noted by Ausubel and Cramton (2002), due to the monopsony power of
large buyers. Such market power is not present in our model due to the large number of bidders. The intuition behind the
inefficiency here is closer in spirit to that behind asymmetric auctions as in Maskin and Riley (2000), where agents with
similar values can end up with different beliefs. Here, it arises in an initially symmetric world and in large auctions.
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a second object of value v , because the bidders have different information about which price is
likely to clear markets. This is at the heart of the discussion above, is illustrated in Example 2
below, and is the critical factor in understanding the properties of and differences between the
auction formats. Unfortunately, this also makes equilibria a challenge to characterize. Neverthe-
less, while we cannot always obtain closed forms for the equilibria, we can still outline the effi-
ciency properties and, in some cases, we can make comparisons of the revenues. In particular, in
many cases our approach applies to all equilibria of these auction formats, including asymmetric
equilibria and/or those in mixed strategies.
It is also important to emphasize that a number of our results do not require any affiliation
of valuations. It is only when we need to examine the equilibria of discriminatory auctions under
a proportional supply of objects that such conditions become important in deducing equilibrium
behaviour.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate the main results and
intuition through several examples. We formalize and generalize these examples in the following
sections. In Section 3 we describe the model. Section 4 examines the case of fixed total supply,
Section 5 examines the case of a proportional supply (fixed per capita supply), and Section 6
discusses extensions such as multi-dimensional information and asymmetries and concludes.
1.1. Contributions and relation to the literature
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that increasing the number of bidders in an auction can lead
to larger increases in revenue than using an optimal reserve price. This suggests that, in a sense,
an increase in the number of agents can be more important than particulars of the auction design.
Knowing this, one might be tempted to conjecture (as we initially did) that with large numbers
of agents we do not have to worry about the particulars of auction design and reasonable auction
formats should have the same properties. That is, one might conjecture that the mechanism design
is secondary to the number of bidders in determining the outcome. Our results show that while
this turns out to be true if the supply of objects is small relative to the number of bidders, it is not
true if the supply is proportional to the number of bidders.
Bali and Jackson (2002) and Kremer (2002) consider auctions with growing numbers of
bidders and a single unit of a good for sale. Kremer shows that in some common values settings
the expected revenues of first price, second price, and English auctions all converge to the ex-
pected value of the object.5 Bali and Jackson show that such convergence holds in a wide class of
auctions and information settings. The results in this paper generalize some of the above results
to a case of multi-unit demand. Again, however, a critical insight here is that such equivalency
results only hold when the supply of objects is negligible relative to the population size.
Swinkels (1999, 2001) examines a setting where the supply of objects is proportional to
the number of bidders and bidders may have multi-unit demands. Swinkels shows that both the
uniform and discriminatory auctions are efficient in the limit and also gets an asymptotic revenue
equivalence result. While our conclusions regarding the uniform auction show that the uniform
price auction is still efficient with correlation in valuations, our conclusion that the discriminatory
auction can yield allocations that are largely inefficient, even in the limit, and that the revenue can
differ substantially across auction formats, are both in contrast to his conclusions. The difference
is that in Swinkels the valuations are independently distributed across bidders, while we allow
for correlation in valuations.6 Under correlation, units that are valued similarly can have different
5. See Goeree and Offerman (1999) for a related result.
6. We have independent participation decisions across bidders, following Swinkels, as a tool to ensure uniqueness
in equilibria. The difference of allowing for correlation in information is the key to the differences in conclusions about
efficiency and revenue.
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information associated with them, which leads to different bidding behaviour and inefficient
allocations under the discriminatory auction format.
2. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE MAIN RESULTS
To get a better idea of some of the issues, let us consider a few simple examples that preview our
central findings. We keep this discussion heuristic. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind our main
results can be seen in these examples. For more detailed arguments see the theorems and proofs
that follow.
Example 1. A Small Number of Objects—Efficient and Equivalent Auctions
Consider an auction with n bidders. There is a number of objects for sale and to fix ideas let
us say that these are tickets for a NBA game. To keep this example simple, let us suppose that
each bidder wants to buy at most two tickets. Bidders vary in how much they are willing to pay,
but there is some correlation among these values. This might represent some overall measure of
fans’ excitement, or how well the team is doing, and how important the particular game is. In
particular, each bidder has a value vi for a first ticket and a value of vi2 for a second ticket. The
valuations vi are independently and identically uniformly distributed between X and some value
X +1. Let X be distributed uniformly on [0,1]. So, while the bidders’ valuations are independent
conditional on X , they are correlated when viewed unconditionally.
First, let us consider a case where there is some small number of tickets for sale, say 100,
and a relatively large number of bidders, say n =10,000. With such a number of bidders, at most
one out of 100 bidders will even obtain a single ticket, much less two. Moreover, each bidder
knows that there are likely to be more than a hundred other bidders who have a valuation for
buying one ticket within 1/100 of their valuation. This competitive pressure leads bidders to bid
nearly their value, and so in both the uniform or discriminatory auctions the objects are sold to
agents who have valuations for the tickets that are nearly X +1 (the upper bound on valuations,
whatever it turns out to be) and for prices of nearly X +1. This is efficient and leads to nearly the
maximum possible revenue for the seller.
Example 2. Proportional Numbers of Objects—Contrasts in Efficiency
Next, consider the same information and valuation structure, but a case where the number
of tickets for sale is proportional to the number of bidders. In particular, let us suppose that the
number of tickets for sale is actually two-thirds the number of bidders. Remember that each
bidder desires two tickets, and so there are three times as many tickets demanded as supplied.
Things here are a bit more complicated to analyse, but nonetheless we can still reach some firm
conclusions.
First, consider the uniform price auction, which is the easier of the two to analyse. With
a large number of bidders, the chance that any given bidder’s bid sets the price is negligible
(see Lemma 1 below). Thus, bidders are effectively price takers. This means that bidders have
incentives to bid at or near their valuations. Their bids play a large role in determining whether
they get an object, but a negligible role in affecting the price. This leads to an approximately
efficient allocation. In this case, the market clearing price is approximately p = 23 X + 49 , which
would be the “competitive price”.7
7. Given the cut-off p, we know that agents with a signal between p and 2p get one unit while agents with a
signal between 2p and X + 1 receive two units. Market clearing implies that p + 2(X + 1 − 2p) = 2/3, which implies
that p = 23 X + 49 .
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Second, consider the discriminatory price auction. Let us argue that every equilibrium in a
discriminatory auction will be significantly inefficient. Suppose, to the contrary, that there was
an (approximately) efficient equilibrium. Consider a bidder with a valuation of a first ticket of
vi = 4/3, and hence a valuation for a second ticket of 2/3. Such a bidder knows that X is at
least 1/3, and so the efficient cut-off value is at least 2/3. As other bidders with values near
vi = 4/3 have the same information—such a bidder’s bid on the second unit will have to be
close to 2/3.8 Now, consider a bidder with a valuation of a bit above 2/3 for a first unit. Such
a bidder only knows that X lies somewhere between 0 and his value. Such a bidder assigns
non-negligible probability that X could be near 0, which would lead to a cut-off value of p
near 4/9. Such a bidder should clearly bid some significant amount less than 2/3, as from that
bidder’s point of view, there is a significant probability that the market clearing price will be
well below 2/3. However, we have now reached a contradiction of efficiency: the bidders with
vi ’s close to 4/3 are bidding near their value, 2/3, for their second unit, and will outbid large
numbers of bidders with vi ’s above 2/3, but who will bid well below 2/3. We conclude that we
get different limiting efficiency properties, with the uniform auction being nearly efficient and
the discriminatory auction not so.
Example 3. Proportional Numbers of Objects—Contrasts in Revenues I
Let us now compare the revenue generated by the different auction formats.
The inefficient outcome in Example 2 results from the multiple demands of agents, which
led to an uncoupling of agents’ information and their valuations. In the context of discriminatory
auctions, this leads to inefficiency, while in the context of uniform auctions it does not, and hence
the contrast between the auctions.
When we turn to revenue comparisons, there are differences between the auctions, regardless
of whether there is such an uncoupling of agents’ information.
Let us first examine the case with a large number of bidders, but where bidders are only
interested in buying a single object. Let there be fewer objects than bidders to keep things inter-
esting. Here, there are equilibria of both auctions that lead to approximately efficient outcomes.9
Despite the fact that both auctions now yield the same allocation, they do not lead to the
same revenues. In this case of unitary demands, the uniform price auction yields strictly higher
revenues than the discriminatory auction, even in the limit.
To see this, suppose that there are only half as many tickets as bidders. Let us consider
a slightly different information structure that makes some explicit calculations of revenue a bit
easier. Each agent’s value for an object is vi , which is uniformly distributed on [0, X ], and X is
uniformly distributed on [0,1].10
We begin by analysing the discriminatory price auction format. The expression for the limit
of the unique symmetric and monotone equilibrium bidding function, b, can be deduced from
Milgrom and Weber (1982) (and omitted details from this example appear in the Appendix). It is
b(v) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
1+ln(2) v for v < 0·5
1
1+ln(2)0·5 for v ≥ 0·5.
8. Under the supposition of efficiency, it must be that bidders with vi ’s just below 4/3 do not get objects, even
though they have almost the same information and know that they are almost certain not to get a second object. If the
bids on second objects were significantly below 2/3, then such bidders could increase their bids and get objects with a
non-trivial probability and at a price below value, which would lead to contradiction.
9. This can be deduced from an extension of Milgrom and Weber (1982).
10. See Jackson and Kremer (2006) for a similar example, but with completely common values.
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Conditional on X = x , we can then compute expected revenues by computing the average
bid over winning signals. As for large n, the winning signals will approximately be uniformly
distributed between x/2 and x , and so limiting revenues conditional on x either converge to
1
1+ln(2)
( 3x
4
)
or something strictly less than this in the case where x > 0·5. Then straightforward
calculations lead to limiting expected revenues of 0·32251+ln(2) or approximately 0·19.
Let us compare this to the revenue from a uniform price auction. In the unique symmetric
equilibrium players use their dominant strategies of bidding vi . This implies that the price is the
valuation of the agent who has the n2 -th highest valuation. The price in a uniform auction thus
converges to x2 as n → ∞. Taking expectations over x, we find that in the uniform auction the
expected revenue per unit converges to 0·25.
Thus, the revenue in large enough uniform price auctions is strictly larger than that of
discriminatory auctions.11
While this ranking of auctions extends beyond this example to all situations with single-unit
demands, the revenue ranking may go either way with multi-unit demands. The following exam-
ple provides a case where the discriminatory auction leads to higher revenue than the uniform
auction.
Example 4. Proportional Numbers of Objects—Contrasts in Revenues II
Reconsider the setting of Example 3 with the following modifications. Agents now value
two objects, with a value for the first object of K + vi and a value for the second object of vi ,
where K > 1 is defined below. There are 3n/2 objects for sale. So, the efficient allocation is that
each bidder gets at least one object, and the n/2 bidders having the highest vi ’s each get two
objects.
The asymptotic expected revenue per object in the Vickrey auction is easy: it converges to
X/2 and in expectation is 0·25.
In the discriminatory auction, the following is the limit of a sequence of equilibria for large
enough K : bidders’ first bid is always 0.5/(1+ ln(2)); and the bidders’ second bid is as described
in Example 3. Without providing full detail, let us sketch why this is the limit of a sequence of
equilibria. If all the first bids are above the support of the low bids, then the second bids are
still the limit of a sequence of equilibria since the n bidders end up bidding for the remaining n/2
items, exactly as in Example 3. So the argument is that for some large enough K and n, all bidders
place their first bid at the top of the support of the lower bids. This simply requires that when
looking conditional on any vi , there is some minimal (bounded away from 0) conditional density
of the cut-off bid falling near the top of the support (which must happen in an equilibrium). Even
if a bidder sees a low vi , that bidder still places some chance on high X ’s. Then for large K ,
lowering a bid by some ε below the top of the support of the expected cut-off will lower the
payment by ε when winning, but loses a value of at least K with probability ε times the marginal
probability lost, which is bounded below.
This sequence of equilibria is asymptotically efficient12 and also gives higher revenue in the
limit than the Vickrey (uniform price) auction. The revenue is as follows: in the limit 2/3 of the
objects are sold at a price of 1/3, and 1/3 of them are sold at a price of slightly more than 0·19;
so this is an average price of more than 0·26, which is higher than average price in the Vickrey
auction of 0·25.
11. Also note that both mechanisms fail to extract the full surplus from the bidders even in the limit. The expected
average value of the goods to winning bidders is E
[ 3X
4
] = 0·325. This is a more general phenomenon that is discussed
in Jackson and Kremer (2004).
12. The example can be modified to be inefficient, and so the ranking of revenues has no general relationship with
asymptotic efficiency.
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This example shows, when combined with Example 3, that one cannot generally rank the
auctions in terms of the asymptotic revenue they generate. Here, the downward-sloping demands
introduce large enough additional asymmetries between first and second object valuations to
result in some interesting behaviour and reversal in revenue ranking from what we saw before.
This example also provides a comment on Example 2 regarding the inefficiency of the dis-
criminatory auctions. Here K is large enough, so that first objects are effectively not competitive
with second objects. It is almost as if there are two separate auctions going on, and this results in
efficient allocations.
3. THE MODEL
3.1. Economies
We examine sequences of economies with increasing numbers of agents. A sequence of economies
is indexed by n, the number of agents in the economy. The agents are potential buyers of objects
in an auction.
A supply of kn identical units of a good is to be sold in economy n.
Each agent values up to m ≥ 1 units of the good.
We examine the two canonical cases of interest:13
• If kn = k for some k and all n, then we say that there is a fixed supply of objects.
• If there exists b ∈ (0,m) such that kn
n
→ b, then we say that there is a proportional supply
of objects.
Many standard auction analyses with a single unit for sale, clearly fall into the fixed case,
while analyses of auctions such as treasury auctions fall into the proportional case. Here, in the
proportional supply case, we span between the extreme cases where b = 0, which is essentially
the fixed supply case, and b = m, which would be a per capita supply that would completely
satiate all agents.
3.2. Information
Information is described by a framework that we borrow from Milgrom (1981), as described
in detail below. This information structure is particularly suited to the discussion of growing
sequences of economies, all based on the same underlying information structure. We use upper
case letters to denote random variables and lower case letters to denote realizations. We use f to
denote a density or conditional density of a random variable and F to denote a distribution. In
some cases when it may be unclear to which random variables we refer, we use subscripts such
as fX (·), while when it is clear we will omit the subscripts.
Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} in economy n observes a private signal Si that takes on values
in [0,1]. There is also an underlying random variable X taking on values in [0,1]. The Si ’s are
independently and identically distributed conditional on X . This conditional distribution of Si
given X is described by a density function f (si |x).
Take X to be distributed on [0,1] with a continuous density with connected support.
This information structure is symmetric across agents and uni-dimensional. We discuss
allowing for asymmetries and multi-dimensional information in Section 6. The assumption that
the random variables have continuous distributions is made to simplify the exposition, but is not
critical to the results.
13. We chose these two categories to simplify the exposition. A tighter classification is whether the supply per
capita converges to 0.
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Let S denote the vector of signals S1, . . . , Sn , and let S−i denote the vector of signals omit-
ting Si . Let Y (k) denote the k-th order statistic of the signals S and let Y−i (k) denote the k-th
order statistic of the signals S−i .
We assume that
Assumption 1. The unconditional (marginal) density of each Si , f (si ), is positive for all
si ∈ [0,1]. For the conditional distribution, there exists α > 0 such that f (x) > 0 implies that
fSi |X (·|x) has connected support and f (si |x) ≥ α for all si in that support.
Assumption 1 is a condition that guarantees that in a large enough economy, any agent
(regardless of what signal they have observed) expects that there will be many other agents who
will have observed arbitrarily nearby signals. This condition provides for competitive pressures
in the limit.
3.3. Preferences
The value of the j-th unit for an agent who has a signal si is given by v j (si ). We assume that
Assumption 2. Agents have private values and desire up to m ≥ 1 units. Their non-
increasing marginal utilities for additional units are described by {v j (si )}mj=1, where v j (si ) ≥
v j ′(si ) for any si and j ≤ j ′. Each v j is differentiable and increasing in si . We normalize v1(si )
to be equal to si .
The utility of an agent i who is awarded J units and pays ti is
J∑
j=1
v j (si )− ti .
Hence, our set-up is based on private (but possibly correlated or affiliated) valuations.
3.4. Noisy participation
In some cases, we follow Swinkels (2001) by considering “noisy participation”. There is uncer-
tainty regarding the exact number of active bidders in the auction, as is natural in the context of a
large number of bidders. This helps rule out certain types of “degenerate” equilibria, such as one
in a uniform price auction with say 1000 bidders and 500 objects, where the first 500 bidders each
bid the maximum value for a single object and the other bidders bid 0. This sort of equilibrium
involves weakly dominated strategies by all the bidders, and requires their exact knowledge of
the number of active bidders. If there is uncertainty about the number of bidders, such strategies
no longer form an equilibrium.14 Formally, this is modelled by
Assumption 3. There is a probability τ > 0 that any given bidder is inactive. The inactivity
is independent across bidders and is independent of X.
14. One can instead rule out such equilibria via an equilibrium refinement that rules out weakly dominated strate-
gies, but with a continuum of actions one has to be careful to work with closures of such strategies and the technical
details for verifying equilibrium conditions can be complicated. Noisy participation is an easy and natural condition that
provides the necessary refinement without any additional machinery.
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Assumption 3 can be thought of as adding an atom in the distribution of signals at Si = 0.
Laws of large numbers imply that for large enough n a fraction of approximately (1− τ) of the
bidders will be active.
3.5. Auctions
We consider uniform price and discriminatory auctions. In both of these auction formats each
active bidder submits m bids. We denote i’s bids by bi ∈ [0,1]m , where the j-th bid of bidder
i is denoted bi j . We order bids so that bi j is non-increasing in j . In both auction formats, the
kn highest bids are each awarded a unit of the good. In the discriminatory auction bidders pay
the sum of their winning bids. So, if bidder i wins 1 ≤ J ≤ m units, then the payment in the
discriminatory auction is
∑J
j=1 bi j . Let B−i (l),denote the l-th highest bid among active bidders
other than i.
In a uniform price auction the winning bidders pay the same price per unit, which is the
kn + 1-st highest bid. So, if bidder i wins 1 ≤ J ≤ m units, then the payment in the uniform
auction is J p, where p is the kn +1-th highest bid out of all bids. There are a number of variations
on rules for uniform price auctions. Some adjust, for instance, to make sure that a bidder i’s price
is not dependent on his own bid. In one such variation each bidder pays the highest non-winning
bid among the other agents. Our results here are unaffected by such details.
3.6. Equilibrium
A strategy is a measurable function σi : [0,1] → ([0,1]m). A strategy is thus a distribution
over submitted bids as a function of i’s information.15 In cases where there is noisy participation,
bidders still formulate a strategy, but randomly some bidders’ bids never make it to the auction.
We consider Bayesian equilibria of the auctions.
In some cases we refer to pure strategy equilibria, in which case we write bi j (si ) to indicate
the j-th bid that i submits as a function of si .
A theorem of Jackson and Swinkels (2005) applies to provide existence of equilibria here.16
3.7. Asymptotic efficiency and surplus extraction
We say that a sequence of equilibria of an auction leads to approximately efficient allocations,
if the average valuations of allocated objects under the specified equilibria approaches (in prob-
ability) the maximizing average of active bidders’ valuations across all possible allocations of the
goods.17
We say that the seller extracts the entire surplus if the seller’s revenue approaches (in prob-
ability) the maximizing sum of active bidders’ valuations across all possible allocations of the
goods.
15. One can equivalently work with distributional strategies à la Milgrom and Weber (1985).
16. Their theorem handles the uncertain number of bidders through the reservation values. Existence of pure strat-
egy and monotone equilibria have been established in certain cases; see Athey (2001), McAdams (2003), Reny and Zamir
(2004), and Reny (2005).
17. With a fixed number of units for sale, having the average value converge to the efficient average implies that that
sum converges to the efficient sum. With a proportional number of units, having the average value converge is weaker than
having the sum converge. As we will show a failure of convergence of the average in some cases, the weaker definition
leads to a stronger conclusion.
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4. A FIXED NUMBER OF UNITS
We begin by analysing the case where a fixed number of units is being sold. Our results here can
be viewed both as a benchmark and as a generalization of results in the previous literature. Here,
there is no asymptotic difference between the two auction formats, which in the limit leads to an
efficient outcome and where the seller extracts the entire surplus.
Theorem 1. Under a fixed supply of objects and Assumptions 1–3, all sequences of equi-
libria of discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions lead to approximately efficient allo-
cations. Moreover, in all sequences of equilibria the seller extracts the entire surplus.
It is important to note that our conclusions hold for the entire equilibrium set and hence do
not depend on the exact form of the equilibrium. That is, we do not rely on the equilibrium being
monotone or even in pure strategies. Our conclusion follows from the competitive pressure that
arises in the limit.
Note also, that this result shows the seller can extract the entire surplus here without using
any reserve price and without much worry as to the choice of auction format.
One might be tempted to argue that not only do the uniform and discriminatory price auc-
tion achieve efficient allocations and full revenue extraction, but that essentially any “standard”
mechanism would do the same. This however is not true. Consider for example, a “posted-price”
mechanism where a price is fixed by the seller and then in the case of a surplus demand the
objects are randomly rationed among buyers who indicate a desire to buy at the posted price. The
allocation will generally be inefficient and the auction yields less than full revenues. Hence, for
such a conjecture to hold one needs to require that the mechanism satisfy some conditions. For
instance, any mechanism that yields an approximately efficient allocation will provide the seller
with the entire surplus.18 Here, it suffices to have the price that a given bidder pays for a given
unit be at least as high as the highest non-winning bid of the other bidders (or some fixed-order
statistic of the non-winning bids) and not exceed the winning bidder’s bid for the given unit. For
details, see the Appendix.
5. A PROPORTIONAL SUPPLY OF OBJECTS
We now examine the case where the supply of objects is proportional to the number of agents,
so that kn grows with n. As we shall see the choice of auction format is now quite relevant. The
uniform price auction and the discriminatory auction differ both in the efficiency of the resulting
allocation and the revenues that the seller can expect. We begin by showing that while the uniform
price auction yields an efficient allocation, the discriminatory auction results in inefficiency even
in the limit.
5.1. Multiple-unit demands
Let us first consider the case where agents desire up to m units of the good (m ≥ 1), and we will
return to the special case where each agent demands at most one object (m = 1).
5.1.1. Efficient allocations in uniform price auctions. We first show that a uniform
price auction achieves an efficient outcome in the limit. A key intuition behind this fact is that
18. Jackson and Kremer (2004) provide results on direct mechanisms under the condition that the equilibrium
allocation results in “concentrated” allocations, where the goods end up in the hands of a vanishing fraction of the agents,
and only those with highest signals. Here, we show that this results from the competitive pressures.
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the probability that a bidder’s actions can have a substantial influence on the price goes to 0 in
the limit, as stated in the following lemma.
This result and the following theorem build almost directly from Swinkels (2001).
The key difference is we are not in a world of independent types. However, the basic ideas
behind his results extend, as do the proofs after some modifications that are addressed in the
Appendix.
Lemma 1. Consider a setting satisfying Assumptions 1–3 and any sequence of equilibria
of uniform price auctions. For any ε > 0, there exists a large enough n such that conditional on
any state X (in the support of G) the probability that any bidder i can influence the price by more
than ε is smaller than ε.
Lemma 1 is an expression of the fact that a uniform price auction is competitive in the limit.
This implies that the price converges to the value of the marginal buyer and the allocation be-
comes efficient. Let pcn denote this price (the kn +1-th highest valuation in the active population),
which we term the “competitive” price.
Theorem 2. Consider a setting satisfying A1–A3 and any sequence equilibria of uniform
price auctions. The equilibrium allocations are asymptotically efficient and the corresponding
equilibrium prices converge to the competitive prices in probability; that is, pn − pcn → 0 in
probability (where pn is the kn +1-th highest bid).
This theorem tells us that uniform price auctions are “well behaved” when the supply of
objects is proportional, providing efficient allocations and competitive prices. We now turn to the
more muddied analysis of discriminatory auctions.
5.1.2. Inefficient allocations in discriminatory auctions. The analysis of discrimina-
tory auctions is trickier. To get some intuition as to why, note that in a sense the discriminatory
auction is like an asymmetric auction (we discuss this in more detail below). For instance, with
n = m = 2 = k each bidder’s high bid competes with the other bidder’s low bid, and vice versa.
With a uniform auction, even with this sort of asymmetry, the incentives are reasonably straight-
forward, as one’s bid is unlikely to affect the price. However, with a discriminatory auction, one’s
bid always affects the price paid (if an object is won). This asymmetry means that bids are no
longer monotone in value when compared across bidders. For example, a value of 1/2 on a second
unit corresponds to a different signal and hence information about the potential bids of others,
than a value of 1/2 on a first unit. This loss of monotonicity across bidders is the key reason why
the discriminatory auction is inefficient (even in the limit).
To gain some intuition behind the result consider two bidders. Bidder I values the first unit
at 1 and second unit at a 1/2, bidder II values the first unit at 1/2 and the second unit at a 1/4. For
the allocation to be efficient, we need that a bid depends only on values. Specifically, consider the
second bid of bidder I and the first bid of bidder II. If these two bids differ then there is potential
for inefficiency. However, this is likely to be the case as bidders I and II have a different posterior
regarding the other bidders. Since there is positive correlation, bidder I expects other bidders to
be more aggressive and hence will bid higher for his second unit.
To simplify the exposition we add several assumptions.
To get some handle on bidding behaviour in discriminatory auctions, we work under the
familiar strict monotone likelihood ratio property (henceforth, MLRP). To simplify the exposition
we also assume continuity.
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Assumption 4. f (si |x) and f (x) are continuous in x, and the strict MLRP holds:
f (si |x)
f (s′i |x)
>
f (si |x ′)
f (s′i |x ′)
for all si > s′i and x > x ′.
Let vn denote the efficient cut-off valuation under a given realization of (active) values, that
is, the kn-th highest valuation.
Let
min(si ) = sup{v| limn Prob(vn ≥ v|Si = si ) = 1}.
So, min(si ) is the minimum of the support of vn under the limiting distribution conditional on
Si = si .19 Note that min(si ) will generally be above 0 even if vn has full support for each n and
regardless of si . For instance, in Example 2, min (si ) = 2 max [0,si−1]/3+4/9.
The important aspect of this definition is that a bidder seeing si would expect the lowest
value still getting an object in the limit under an efficient allocation to be at least min(si ). In
particular, this implies that if the allocation were to be efficient, then a bidder seeing a signal si
and having a value for one of their objects near min(si ) would expect to have to bid near min(si )
to get an object.
The MLRP assumption implies that min(si ) is non-decreasing.
Next we assume that there is some possibility that at least somebody gets m objects.
Assumption 5. In an efficient allocation, at least one type sees a positive probability of
obtaining m units. That is, min(si ) < vm(si ) for some si . Moreover, min(si ) is continuous.
Assumption 5 is essentially without loss of generality, as otherwise we can reset m to simply
cover units that might be obtained.
Since min(si ) and vm(si ) are continuous and min(si ) lies above vm(si ) at si = 0, and below
vm(si ) for some si under Assumption 5, it follows that there exists s∗ so that min(s∗) = vm(s∗).
So s∗ identifies a signal that lets a bidder know that his or her valuation for an m-th object is
just on the border of sometimes vs. never being awarded an object under an efficient allocation.
There could be many such signals, let us pick any one of them.
We assume that
Assumption 6. min(vm(s∗)) < min(s∗), for some s∗ such that min(s∗) = vm(s∗).
While Assumption 5 is fairly mild, Assumption 6 has a bit more to it. Assumption 6 requires
that what an agent sees as the lowest possible valuation getting an object in the limit in an efficient
allocation is increasing between vm(s∗) and s∗ (or at least comparing the endpoints). This means
that signals convey some information about the support of the efficient cut-off value vn , at least
in the limit.
The fact that signals convey information about the efficient cut-off value is sufficient to
ensure that agents who have nearly the same valuation for one of their objects, but hold different
signals, will bid substantially differently in equilibrium. It is easily checked that Assumption 6
is satisfied in Example 2. One can also find reasonable examples that violate Assumption 6. For
example, if X is uniformly distributed on [0,1] and si is uniformly distributed on [X,1], then
min(si ) = 0·5 for all si , which violates Assumption 6.20
19. Note that the limiting distribution can have a support that varies with signals even without any of the underlying
distributions having supports that vary with signals.
20. Nevertheless, we conjecture that the same result holds in situations where agents can have the same values for
units (say, one for his or her first unit and the other for the m-th unit) but have sufficiently different beliefs about what
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Theorem 3 states that under the above assumptions, the discriminatory auction always yields
inefficient outcomes even in the limit.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1–6 and m > 1, every sequence of equilibria of discrim-
inatory auctions fails to be asymptotically efficient.
The intuition behind the theorem is similar to the intuition we discussed above and was
illustrated in Example 2. If the allocation were to be efficient, some of the marginal bids would
be coming from bidders who are bidding on their first unit (with value si ), while others would be
coming from bidders who are bidding on their last unit (with value vm(si )). Under Assumption
6, these two classes of bidders are both near the margin for an efficient allocation, but have
different beliefs about the cut-off value. This provides for different bidding behaviour for the
same valuations. The resulting bids are not monotonic in values, and the allocation fails to be
efficient, even approximately and asymptotically.
5.2. Comparing revenues in the two auctions
It is natural to conjecture that the asymptotic revenue for the discriminatory auction would be
no higher than that of the uniform price auction. The reason that this seems natural is that the
uniform price auction leads to an asymptotically efficient allocation and the competitive price in
the limit, while the discriminatory auction can lead to an inefficient allocation. Hence, one might
guess that the discriminatory auction leads to a correspondingly lower price. While this is true in
some cases, it is not always true.
We begin with the case of single-unit demands. Here, it turns out that there is a difference
between the auctions; but somewhat surprisingly, this is true even though both auctions lead to
the same efficient allocation.
5.3. Comparing revenues with single-unit demands
A well-studied case in the literature (e.g. see Milgrom, 1981) is one where agents demand only a
single unit (m = 1).
Note that under Assumption 4 there exist (symmetric) equilibria for both the uniform and
discriminatory auctions and that they support the same efficient allocation, where the kn high-
est signal holders obtain the objects. The unique symmetric equilibrium strategy in the uniform
price auction is for bidders to use the dominant strategy of bidding their value. An extension
of the equilibrium of the first price auction described in Milgrom and Weber (1982) constitutes
a symmetric equilibrium in a multiple-unit discriminatory mechanism. The following theorem
refers to that equilibrium and the dominant strategy equilibrium in the uniform price auction. We
conjecture that these are the unique equilibria (under Assumption 3), but do not have a proof of
this.21
the cut-off price is likely to be. The (sufficiently) different beliefs about the distribution of the cut-off price would lead to
two different bids for similarly valued items and would thus create inefficiencies that exist even in the limit. Assumption
6 is sufficient to guarantee this, and it allows us to bound bidders’ behaviour, even in situations where we know very little
about the specific structure of the equilibrium. However, Assumption 6 is not necessary, and so some weaker condition
should also suffice (but possibly with a much more difficult proof).
21. These are the unique equilibria in the class of monotonic symmetric equilibria in which bidders use pure strate-
gies, but their overall uniqueness properties are more difficult to ascertain. In terms of uniqueness, recall that the uncertain
number of bidders rules out the standard asymmetric equilibria in the uniform auction case. Techniques used by McAdams
(2005a,b) to deduce monotonicity and uniqueness in first price auctions might be extendable to our setting.
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Theorem 4. Let Assumptions 2 and 4 hold and kn
n
→ b where 1 > b > 0. The uniform
price auction yields higher expected revenue per capita (and per unit) than a discriminatory
price auction, by an amount that is bounded below as n → ∞.
We prove the theorem (in the Appendix) using the following technique.22 Using the logic of
Milgrom and Weber (1982), we can show that the expected payment of any given signal holder
in a uniform auction is at least that of his clone in a discriminatory auction. We then argue that
above a certain signal (one that is approximately sure to receive an object for large n) the payment
schedule for a discriminatory auction flattens out, as higher signal holders can always bid as if
they had this lower signal and will still be approximately certain to get an object. In the uniform
auction, however, this payment schedule does not flatten out, as under strict MLRP observers of
higher signals expect higher market clearing prices. Through this, we establish a bound on the
difference in revenues.
While Theorem 4 shows that a uniform auction leads to higher expected revenues than a
discriminatory auction when each bidder demands at most one unit, this unambiguous ranking
no longer holds when there are multiple-unit demands. With multiple-unit demands the rankings
can go either way.
To see that uniform auction revenues can exceed discriminatory auction revenues with
multiple-unit demands, consider a simple extension of the single-unit case, where bidders value
all of their objects at the same value. In that case, bidder behaviour in the limit looks similar
to the single-unit case, and so uniform auctions in that situation lead to higher revenues than
discriminatory auctions.
In contrast, in a situation where each bidder has a large difference between marginal valu-
ations for some objects, then we saw in Example 4 that it is also possible for the revenue of the
discriminatory auction to exceed that of the uniform price auction.
These results suggest that there might be some relationship between the shape of individual
demand curves and the revenue rankings of the two auction formats. While this seems to have
some intuition behind it, we have not been able to discover any such general result.
6. DISCUSSION: ASYMMETRIES AND MULTI-DIMENSIONAL INFORMATION
One might conjecture that in a competitive environment the particulars of the market structure
is largely irrelevant. We have shown that this conclusion is limited to the case in which there is
a vanishing number of objects for sale relative to the number of bidders. When the number of
objects for sale is proportional to the number of bidders, the particulars of the auction format
matter. While the efficiency properties of some prominent auction formats are unambiguous (but
different), their relative revenue ranking depends on the circumstances.
Our set-up may be viewed as somewhat restrictive as information is one-dimensional and
bidders have their information drawn from the same distribution. However, it is important to em-
phasize that generalizing the model to allow for asymmetries and multi-dimensional information
would not change our main conclusions. With many bidders the uniform price auction would
still yield the efficient outcome, as agents would bid according to their values.23 A discrimina-
tory auction with proportional supply would still yield inefficient outcomes for the same reasons
that we saw here. In fact, the intuition behind our result is precisely that of asymmetries among
22. This technique can also be used to establish a parallel result for the case of common values (see Jackson and
Kremer, 2006), and in fact the result extends to situations where bidders’ valuations depend in monotone ways on both
their signal and the common factor X .
23. It is important that the values be private for this conclusion. With interdependent valuations, attaining efficiency
is problematic as shown quite powerfully by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001a,b).
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bidders: bidders with the same values for some objects can bid differently as their information
about the likely bidding behaviour of other agents can differ. Hence, in a sense the fact that we as-
sume a symmetric set-up with uni-dimensional signals makes the results more striking, as interim
asymmetries with uni-dimensional signals are already enough to produce significant differences
between the auction formats. Incorporating asymmetries or multi-dimensional information would
simply amplify the differences between the auction formats.
APPENDIX
Details behind Example 3
Let FYn/2|Vi and fYn/2|Vi denote the distribution and density functions of the median signal conditional on Vi . A similar
argument to that of Milgrom and Weber (1982) shows that a monotonic symmetric pure strategy equilibrium bidding
function in the n-th economy, bn , is the solution to the differential equation
bn′(vi )FYn/2|vi (vi |vi ) = fYn/2|vi (vi |vi )(vi −bn(vi ))
with a boundary condition bn(0) = 0. Note that FYn/2|vi (vi |vi ) → ln(2)ln(1/vi ) (which can be verified by noting that
FYn/2|vi (vi |vi ) = FX |vi (2vi |vi ), and then calculating FX |vi ), while fYn/2|vi (vi |vi ) → 1vi ln(1/vi ) if vi < 0·5 and → 0 if
vi > 0·5. Hence,
vi b′(vi ) ln(2) = vi −bn(vi )
for vi < 0·5 and b′(vi ) = 0 for vi > 0·5. Together with the boundary condition, b(0) = 0, this implies that
b(v) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
1+ln(2) v for v < 0·5
1
1+ln(2) 0·5 for v ≥ 0·5.
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider a fixed supply of objects such that kn = k, and a setting that satisfies Assumptions
1–3. We prove the claim by relying on the following properties that are satisfied by both auctions:
• Both auctions award objects to the highest bids.
• In both auctions the price that a given bidder pays for a given unit is at least as high as the highest non-winning
bid of the other bidders and does not exceed the given bidder’s bid for the given unit.
• In both auctions the price that a given bidder pays is non-decreasing in the vector of own bids.
We argue that in any auction that satisfies the above properties all sequences of equilibria lead to approximately
efficient allocations and are such that the seller extracts the entire surplus.
To see this let pn denote the lowest price paid for a unit in auction n. We prove the theorem by showing that there
is a vanishing probability that a bidder finds the lowest equilibrium price, pn , to be significantly lower than his value for
the first unit. In particular, we show that for any i,δ > 0 and large enough n,
Pr(pn < v1(Si )− δ) = Pr(pn < Si − δ) ≤ δ. (A.1)
Under Assumption 1, Si has a non-vanishing probability of being within δ/2 of the highest possible signal. Hence, the
distance between pn and the highest realized signal converges to 0 in probability, which implies full revenue extraction.
This implies the theorem as given the private values setting (Assumption 2) and the structure of the auctions, bidders
never expect to pay more than their value in equilibrium (as they would do better by lowering their bids otherwise).
Hence, we also get approximate efficiency, as the objects must be allocated to agents with valuations between 1− δ′ and
the highest signal, for arbitrary δ′. So let us show (A.1) . Note that since the distribution is symmetric it is enough to
show that (A.1) holds for a sequence {in}. This is useful, since the equilibrium need not be symmetric. Let εn converge
to 0 more slowly than 1n ; that is,
1
nεn
→ 0. Let Ani denote the set of signals for which bidder i’s conditional expected
number of objects won in the auction is less than εn . That is, letting qni be the random variable representing the number
of objects that bidder i obtains in the n-th auction,
Ani = {s|E(qni |Si = s) < εn}.
Note that in the definition of Ani we integrate only on the events in which i participates. By the definition of A
n
i ,
there must exist a sequence of {in} for which Pr(Sin ∈ Anin ) → 1, as otherwise, the total number of objects expected to
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be received would exceed the total supply (recalling that εn converges to 0 at a slower rate than 1/n). Suppose that for
some δ the k-th highest bid offered by bidders other than in , B−in (k), satisfies
Pr(B−in (k) < s − δ|Sin = s) > δ
for infinitely many n and some s ∈ Anin for each of those n. In that case, for large enough n, in could deviate from the
purported equilibrium strategy to strictly gain by bidding s −δ, which would be a contradiction. Thus, for any δ, for large
enough n,
Pr(B−in (k) < s − δ|Sin = s) ≤ δ (A.2)
for all s ∈ Anin . This is not sufficient to conclude the proof as in the uniform price auction the price equals the k + 1-th
highest bid and one needs to worry about the possibility of equilibria with minimal prices. Nevertheless, Lemma A1
(below) shows that under noisy participation (Assumption 3), inequality (A.2) implies that for any δ, for large enough n
Pr(B−in (k +1) < s − δ|Sin = s) ≤ δ (A.3)
for any s ∈ Anin . We also know from the structure of the auction that pn ≥ B−i (k + 1) for any i . Thus, it follows from(A.3) that for any δ and large enough n
Pr(pn < s − δ|Sin = s) ≤ δ (A.4)
for all s ∈ Anin . Integrating (A.4) over s ∈ Anin given that Pr(Sin ∈ Anin ) → 1 implies that for any δ, Pr(pn < Sin −δ) ≤ 2δ,
for large enough n (where the extra δ accounts for the vanishing probability of signals outside of Anin ), which implies the
desired claim. ‖
We now prove Lemma A1, which was referred to in the proof above.
Lemma A 1. Under noisy participation (Assumption 3) and a fixed number of units kn = k for sale if, for given
sequences of bidders {in} and signals {sn} that are such that for any given δ > 0
Pr(B−in (k) < sn − δ|Sin = sn) ≤ δ (A.5)
for large n, then also for any δ > 0 for large enough n
Pr(B−in (k +1) < sn − δ|Sin = sn) ≤ δ.
Proof. Suppose the contrary, then we can find some δ∗ > 0 so that
Pr(B−i (k +1) < sn − δ∗|Sin = sn) > δ∗ (A.6)
despite the fact that
Pr(B−i (k) < sn − δ∗|Sin = sn) → 0. (A.7)
Using our version of the “Mineral Rights” model we can find a sequence of states in the support of the set of states,
{xn}, so that
Pr(B−i (k +1) < sn − δ∗|X = xn) > δ′ (A.8)
for some δ′ > 0 despite the fact that
Pr(B−i (k) < sn − δ∗|X = xn) → 0. (A.9)
For every bidder j 
= in let Znj be the (random) number of bids that j 
= in has above sn − δ; so Znj ∈ {0,1, . . . ,m}. To
account for how many bids by j 
= in end up above sn − δ > 0 under the participation noise, Assumption 3, we define
a new random variable, which is equal to Znj with probability (1− τ) and equals 0 with probability τ . Let the resulting
random variables be denoted as Zˆnj which, conditional on X = xn , are independent (but not identically distributed). In
this notation, (A.8) and (A.9) (applying (A.9) at sn ) become
Pr
⎛
⎝∑
j 
=in
Zˆnj < k +1|X = xn
⎞
⎠> δ′ (A.10)
and
Pr
⎛
⎝∑
j 
=in
Zˆnj < k|X = xn
⎞
⎠→ 0. (A.11)
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By subtracting (A.11) from (A.10), it follows that
Pr
⎛
⎝∑
j 
=in
Zˆnj = k|X = xn
⎞
⎠> δ′ (A.12)
for infinitely many n.
We get a contradiction by arguing that (A.12) implies that Pr(∑ j 
=in Zˆnj < k|X = xn
)
is above some level for
infinitely many n.
To see this write,
Pr
⎛
⎝∑
j 
=in
Zˆnj = k|X = xn
⎞
⎠=∑
z
Pr
⎛
⎝∑
j 
=in
Zˆnj = k|
∑
j 
=in
Znj = z
⎞
⎠Pr
⎛
⎝∑
j 
=in
Znj = z|X = xn
⎞
⎠ . (A.13)
Define the set An by
An =
⎧⎨
⎩z|Pr
⎛
⎝∑
j 
=in
Zˆnj = k|
∑
j 
=in
Znj = z
⎞
⎠≥ δ′/4
⎫⎬
⎭ . (A.14)
From (A.12) and (A.13), it follows that Pr(An |X = xn) ≥ δ′/4. Note that Pr
(∑
j Zˆ nj = k|
∑
j 
=in Z
n
j = z
)
goes to 0 as z
gets large (as it is bounded above by the probability of getting at most k 1’s realized out of N Bernoulli random variables
with a probability of (1− τ) on each). Thus, there exists a bound M so that for all large enough n, if z ∈ An then z < M .
However, this implies that for each z ∈ An
Pr
⎛
⎝∑
j 
=in
Zˆnj < k|
∑
j 
=in
Znj = z
⎞
⎠≥ Pr
⎛
⎝∑
j 
=in
Zˆnj = 0|
∑
j 
=in
Znj = z
⎞
⎠> τ M .24
Since Pr(An |X = xn) ≥ δ′/4, we have shown that
Pr
⎛
⎝∑
j 
=in
Zˆnj < k|X = xn
⎞
⎠≥ τ M δ′/4
for infinitely many n, which contradicts (A.11). ‖
Proof of Lemma 1. We first measure the influence a bidder has on prices by looking at the event in which he is able
to push the price above some threshold y ∈ [0,1], given that the price would be below y in the absence of the bidder’s
bids. For bidder i to be able to push the price above y it must be that B−i (kn −m) > y and B−i (kn) < y. Laws of large
numbers imply that this happens with low probability. Specifically, the argument used in Lemma 9.2 in Swinkels (2001)
shows that for any ε > 0 there exists some Nε so that n > Nε implies that for any state X and bidder i :
Pr(B−i (kn −m) > y and B−i (kn) < y|X) < ε.
A sketch of the argument is as follows. There are (n − 1)m bids of bidders besides i. One can define random variables
{Z j } j 
=i that give the number of bids above y that are submitted by bidder j . The probability that i pushes the price
above y when starting below is then bounded by Pr
(∑
j 
=i Z j ∈ [kn −m,kn ]
)
. Conditional on X bids are independent,
and hence so are the {Z j }. This implies that this probability is negligible for large n since m is finite.
The above inequality implies that if we fix a positive integer J , then for any j ∈ {1, . . . , J } there exists N j such that
for n > N j
Pr
(
B−i (kn −m) > jJ and B−i (knt) <
j
J
|X
)
<
1
J 2
.
Letting N∗ = max j N j , it follows that for all n > N∗
Pr
(
∃ j : B−i (kn −m) > jJ and B−i (kn) <
j
J
|X
)
<
J
J 2
= 1
J
.
24. One could multiply the inequality by the number of different ways of choosing M alternatives out of n˙. However,
since the expression would not be monotone decreasing in M we use a more modest bound.
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Let p1 denote the price if bidder i submits the maximal possible bid on all of his units, and let p0 denote the price if i
bids 0 on all of his units. The above inequality implies that for any J there exists NJ such that Pr
(
p1 − p0 > 2J
)
< 1J
for n > NJ . To conclude the proof let J = 2/ε. ‖
Proof of Theorem 2. First, let us show that the price converges to the competitive price. That is, for any δ > 0, for
all high enough n, Pr(|pcn − pn | > δ) < δ.
Suppose that this is not the case, so that there exists δ > 0 such that for all n (taking a subsequence if necessary),
Pr(pcn − pn > δ) > δ. [The case where pn exceeds pcn is analogous.] Since both prices and values are bounded in [0,1]
there exists some δ∗ > 0 and some a ∈ [0,1] such that for all n25
Pr(pn < a and pcn > a + δ∗) > δ∗.
Hence, for large enough n there is a probability bounded away from 0 that some bidder who values a unit above a + δ∗2
does not obtain that object and the price is less than a. Consider a deviation for such bidders to bid truthfully instead.
This increases the expected number of units that such a bidder gets, but may also affect the clearing price. However, by
Lemma 1 the price implications for such a deviation are negligible for large n. This yields a contradiction as it guarantees
an extra unit at a profit bounded away from 0 for such a bidder for large enough n, with negligible price impact.
Next, note that a similar argument to that above (again invoking Lemma 1) implies that although bidders may place
some bids above or below their corresponding values in equilibrium, this can only be in cases where for large enough
n, changing those bids to be equal to the corresponding values would have a negligible probability of affecting the
equilibrium allocation.
The approximate efficiency follows from the convergence of price to the competitive one, and bidders bidding as if
they bid their values. ‖
Proof of Theorem 3. The following lemma is useful.
Consider an n-bidder discriminatory auction. Let pn denote the minimal price paid in equilibrium, that is, the kn -th
highest bid, and let bni j (si ) denote the bid by i in the n-th auction for a j-th object when observing si . Also, for any
1 ≤ j ≤ m and δ > 0 let
Ani, j,δ = {si |Pr(v j (si ) > vn + δ and pn > bni j (si )) > δ},
Cni, j,δ = {si |Pr(v j (si ) < vn − δ and pn < bni j (si )) > δ}.
Lemma A2. If there exists δ > 0 such that for all bidders i , all large enough n, and some j either Pr(Ani, j,δ) > δ
or Pr(Cni, j,δ) > δ, then the discriminatory price auction is not asymptotically efficient. That is, the expected efficiency
loss per capita does not converge to 0.
Proof. Suppose that Pr(Ani, j,δ) > δ for arbitrary large n; the case where Pr(Cni, j,δ) > δ is similar. Any signal that
belongs to this set results in an expected efficiency loss of at least δ2. The fact that Pr(Ani, j,δ) > δ implies (appealing to
the law of large numbers) that there is an expected ex ante efficiency loss that is bounded away from 0 when summing
across bidders. ‖
Assume by contradiction that the outcome is asymptotically efficient.
First, let us argue that there exists δ1 such that bni1(si ) < vm (s
∗) − δ1 for all bidders i and all signals
si ∈ [vm (s∗),vm (s∗)+ δ1] for large enough n. Using the continuity of min(s) and Assumptions 5 and 6 we conclude
that there exists an ε such that agents with a signal si ∈ [vm (s∗),vm (s∗)+ ε] can expect to win their first unit with a
probability of at least ε by bidding vm (s∗)−ε for large enough n. This follows as prices never exceed vn . In equilibrium,
these bidders make an expected profit on their first unit of at least ε2 and hence they must be bidding below their value
by at least ε2. If we let δ1 = ε2 we get that bn1 (si ) < vm (s∗)− δ1 for all signals si ∈ [vm (s∗),vm (s∗)+ δ1].
Next, note that there exists some δ2 > 0 so that si ∈ [s∗,s∗ + δ2] implies that bni,m (si ) > vm (s∗)− δ1. This follows
since bidders with signals close to (but above) s∗ have a low but positive probability of winning their m-th object in an
efficient allocation, but that probability goes to 0 in n if they underbid by any fixed amount. As a result they bid close to
their reservation value on their m-th object for large n. Hence, there exists some δ2 > 0 so that si ∈ [s∗,s∗ + δ2] implies
that bnm (si ) > vm (s∗)− δ1.
25. Partition [0,1] into 2/δ intervals of size δ/2 each, {[ai ,ai+1]}1/2δi=1 . The case in which pn < pcn − δ implies
that we can find some ai so that pn < ai and pcn > ai+1. This implies that there exists some interval for which Pr(pn <
ai and pcn > ai+1) > δ2/2. Hence, we let δ∗ = δ2/2.
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If we let δ∗ = min(δ1,δ2) we conclude that agents with signal si ∈ [vm (s∗),vm (s∗)+ δ1] bid on their first unit no
more than vm (s∗)− δ∗ while agents with signal si ∈ [s∗,s∗ + δ∗] bid on their m-th unit at least this amount. Consider
now the event that
vn ∈ (vm (s∗)+2δ∗/5,vm (s∗)+3δ∗/5).
Since we assume that the distribution of signals has a full support, this event occurs with some positive probability δ∗∗.
Consider two cases:
(i) pn ≥ vm (s∗)− δ∗ : This event maps to those of type A in Lemma A2. Bidders with types si ∈ [vm (s∗)+4δ∗/5,
vm (s
∗)+ δ∗] are not awarded their first object despite the fact that their valuation exceeds the cut-off by more
than δ∗/5.
(ii) pn < vm (s∗)−δ∗ : This event maps to those of type C in Lemma A2. Bidders with types si ∈ [vm (s∗), vm (s∗)+
δ∗/5] are awarded their m-th unit despite the fact that their valuation is lower than the cut-off by more than δ∗/5.
Since either (i) or (ii) occurs with probability of at least δ∗∗/2 for large enough n, Lemma A2 implies a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let tn,d (si ), tn,u(si ) be the expected payment (unconditional on whether a bidder wins) of
a bidder conditional on observing signal Si = si , in the discriminatory and the uniform price mechanisms, respectively.
The expected revenues in the respective mechanisms are
n
∫
tn,(si )d F(si ) for  = u,d. (A.15)
Given Assumptions 2 and 4, an argument similar to that underlying Theorem 15 in Milgrom and Weber (1982)
implies that
tn,u(si ) ≥ tn,d (si ) for every n and si .
This implies that the expected revenue in the uniform price mechanism is no lower than in the discriminatory one.
However, it does not guarantee that there exists a positive difference that is bounded below as we increase the number of
bidders. To show that such gap exists, we argue that there is an interval in which tn,d (si ) becomes flat as n increases and
that on the same interval, tn,u(si ) is increasing.
We identify the interval as follows. Let s∗(x) be the solution to F(si |x) = 1 − b, where recall knn → b. Note that
under Assumption 4, s∗(x) is increasing and continuous in x . Let the interval be [s∗,1], where s∗ is the maximum of the
support of the random variable s∗(X). So, in the limit in an efficient allocation, any value above s∗ should be getting an
object, regardless of the realization of X .
Let us first show that tn,d (si ) becomes flat as n increases on the interval [s∗,1]. Note that s∗ < 1 since the distribution
of Si conditional on X = 1 is described by a density function and b < 1, and so 1 > s∗(1) ≥ s∗. Also, since f (si ) > 0
for all si , there is a positive (unconditional) probability that Si ∈ [s∗,1]. For any si ∈ (s∗,1], there is a large enough n
so that a bidder observing Si = si has an arbitrarily high (pre-specified) probability of observing one of the highest kn
signals. This implies that an agent who has a signal si > s∗ can pretend to have a lower signal with a minimal effect on
the probability of getting an object, for some large enough n. Hence, we conclude that for any si > s′i > s∗
tn,d (si )− tn,d (s′i ) → 0. (A.16)
This implies that while tn,d (si ) is increasing in si ,26 it converges to being flat over the interval (s∗,1] as n increases.
We now complete the proof of the theorem by showing that indeed tn,u converges point-wise on (s∗,1] to a function
t∗ that is increasing over (s∗,1]. We first note with private values bidders bid their values. That is, a bidder who values
the good at si bids si . This implies that the price is given by the kn+1 highest signal. Hence, if si > s∗, since agent i wins
the auction with certainty it follows that:
tn,u(si ) → E(s∗(X)|Si = si ).
To see that indeed t∗(si ) is increasing on (s∗,1] note first s∗(x) is increasing in x . Moreover, Assumption 4 implies that
the distribution of X conditional on Si = si is stochastically dominated by the distribution of X conditional on Si = s′i ,
where s′i > si . The result then follows from the stochastic dominance. ‖
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26. This follows from incentive compatibility (Assumption 2) and the strict MLRP (Assumption 4).
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